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ABSTRACT
This article aims to assess the impact of a specific regulation, namely the European Union 
emission trading system (EU-ETS) on the Eco-Innovation (EI) activities of the companies, to 
evaluate its effectiveness in changing the companies’ environmental behavior. It also intends to 
empirically examine whether the EU-ETS and its ‘stringency’ are significantly related to EI, 
taking into account both the internal and external factors that might be correlated with EI. To this 
end, we develop a cross-sectional framework using the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data 
and create a stringency indicator for the period between 2012-2014 for 13 European countries. 
We found that the EU-ETS has limited and some controversial effects. Furthermore, technology 
policies emerge as an important element of the policy mix complementing climate policy. Based 
on our findings, we make recommendations for policymakers on how to improve the existing 
policy mix.
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In consequence of the worldwide growing concerns 
about the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to 
reduce the impact of climate change, the European 
Union (EU) has launched a strategy that comprises sev-
eral initiatives, such as the International Climate Policy 
(e.g. the Paris Agreement) [1], the Climate and Energy 
Action Framework for 2030 [2], the Renewable Energy 
Directive, among others. Preceding the Paris Agreement 
as an International Climate Pact [3], the Kyoto Protocol 
emerged, which was based on three mechanisms, namely 
the Clean Development Mechanism, the Joint 
Implementation, and the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). This last system acts as a 
cap (global limit), where a maximum of CO2 emissions 
is established, determining the number of emission 
allowances provided. Therefore, if an installation emits 
more CO2 than the licenses received, it will have to buy 
licenses, but if it emits less, it will be able to sell the 
remaining ones.
Companies, in particular those in the sectors involved 
in the allowances market, are subject to pressures to 
adopt better environmental behaviors, either compulso-
rily through policy measures or voluntarily through the 
market and competition, or simply to reduce related 
operating costs, concerning, for instance, energy, raw 
materials or waste treatment. In this way, there are sev-
eral motivations for Eco-innovating. Eco-Innovation 
(EI) is understood as any product, process, organiza-
tional, social, or institutional innovation that can reduce 
environmental impact and resource use [4, 5, 6]. Several 
studies look for the determinants of EI. These determi-
nants can be internal or external to the company [7, 8]. 
Environmental policies, namely the aforementioned 
EU-ETS, are within the external determinants of EI [9]. 
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of lock-in problems of well-developed and well-embed-
ded technologies in power supply and transport, the EI 
policy is stronger than the traditional innovation policy 
[4]. Del Río et al. [6] state that regulatory stringency 
affects the rate and direction of EIs and is a crucial ele-
ment to encourage them, especially the radical ones. 
Moreover, according to the so-called Porter Hypothesis, 
stricter environmental regulations encourage environ-
mental technologies that reduce both the environmental 
impact of production activities and the costs of comply-
ing with regulation [14].
Environmental innovative firms cooperate on innova-
tion with external partners (suppliers and universities) to 
a higher extent than other innovative firms [8]. In a 
study applied to Spain, De Marchi [8] presents some 
results that suggest that the R&D cooperation is more 
intense for environmental innovators than for other 
innovators. The policy action, within the form of public 
grants, fosters innovations that reduce the impact on the 
environment to an higher extent than other innovations.
A study conducted by Borghesi et al. [15] about Italy, 
suggests the importance of well-designed, long-term, 
and time-consistent policies to promote the develop-
ment of cleaner technologies for energy efficiency and 
CO2 abatement. Results show that current and future 
expected regulations are highly correlated to EI and the 
policy stringency is negatively related to innovation 
diffusion, a result that applies to both types of EI con-
sidered, internal and external to the firm. It is also 
important to understand how the green system works at 
a regional level. A study by Antonioli et al. [16] for 
Emilia-Romagna, in Italy, shows that firms that share 
the municipality location with EI adopters are more 
likely to adopt EIs, which highlights the relevance of 
agglomeration economies and native institutional condi-
tions in providing concrete (innovative) contents to the 
green economy paradigm. Moreover, at a municipal 
level spillovers tend to prevail over other geographical 
factors and to the respective economic activity sector, 
and, therefore, EIs may be considered as a key source of 
growth for regional systems, particularly when spurred 
by local spillovers.
In Crespi et al. [17] the authors differentiate weak EI 
(e.g. incremental or radical innovation with low penetra-
tion rates) from strong EI (e.g. incremental or radical EI 
that have high penetration rates and thus a high environ-
mental impact) and state that policies should be focused 
on the uptake of strong EI, and on radical ones, to max-
imize the environmental benefits.
Some authors show that environmental regulation is one 
of the strongest determinants of this EI [10, 11], although 
other authors show that its effect is not so relevant [12, 
13], with no consensus in the literature.
Thus, this article intends to estimate the impact of a 
specific regulation, EU-ETS, on the Eco-Innovation 
activities of the companies involved in the market, to 
assess its effectiveness in changing the environmental 
behavior of companies. The proposed metric is effective 
to deliver the expected outcomes, specifically on the 
Eco-Innovation strategy, as caught up by the firm-level 
data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). 
Therefore, we intend to contribute to the existent litera-
ture by empirically examining whether the EU-ETS and 
its ‘stringency’ is significantly related to EI, taking into 
account both the internal and external factors that might 
be correlated with EI. Furthermore, we compare eco-
nomic activity sectors, contributing with a different 
approach to analyze the relationship between EI strate-
gies and the effectiveness of the EU-ETS market.
The rest of the article is divided as follows. Section 2 
presents an overview of previous research exploring the 
links between EI, policy regulation and competitiveness, 
and the EU-ETS market. Section 3 exposes the methods 
and data collected for this work, while section 4 presents 
the empirical results and discusses some policy implica-
tions derived from these. Finally, section 5 concludes the 
work, pointing some future research direction needs.
2. Literature Review
In this section, a theoretical framework is provided to 
understand the influence of regulatory policies on 
eco-innovation, as well as their effect on market compet-
itiveness. Additionally, a literature review on the origin 
and evolution of the European Union – Emissions 
Trading System (EU-ETS) together with its impacts on 
EI are presented, which is the aim of our study.
2.1.  Eco-innovation, policy regulation, and 
competitiveness
Innovation has always been seen as part of the solution 
to environmental problems. However, before 2005 few 
programs at the EU level had specifically addressed the 
stimulation of environmental innovations. Since then, 
Eco-Innovation started receiving growing attention [4]. 
Indeed, the literature about the role of policy regulation 
in EI promotion is developed mainly after 2010. As the 
benefits of EI are undervalued in the market and because 
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In countries with a certain level of policy stringency, 
and where the choice of environmental policies is more 
flexible, there is a greater propensity to generate widely 
diffused innovations and to benefit from innovations 
generated elsewhere [18]. Indeed, results from Kemp 
and Pontoglio [19] show that flexibility has a positive 
impact on Eco-Innovation. However, they found that the 
flexibility of EU-ETS, within the banking and borrow-
ing context, worked against the development of innova-
tions. Furthermore, the results did not find the best 
instrument to foster innovative response to environmen-
tal regulations, although taxes and emissions trading 
systems were found to be superior in promoting innova-
tion than regulation. Yet, this can be true for low-cost 
improvement innovations but does not appear to be true 
for radical innovation.
As it is shown by Horbach et al. [11], the regulation 
in Germany features a strong influence on EIs, particu-
larly to push firms to scale back air (e.g. CO2, SO2, or 
NOx), water or noise emissions, to avoid hazardous 
substances, and to increase the recyclability of products. 
Cost savings are also of great importance as a motiva-
tion for reducing energy and material use, with the 
energy and raw material prices and taxation considered 
as drivers for EI. Another important source of EI is the 
customer requirements [20], especially products with 
improved environmental performance and process inno-
vations that enhance material efficiency, and reduce 
energy consumption, waste, and therefore the use of 
dangerous substances.
A robust and well-functioning financial market helps 
investors to tap into the commercial potential of clean 
energy, contributes to social desires, the expansion of 
cleaner energy, and energy efficiency and environmental 
sustainability [21]. However, Al Mamun et al. [22] warn 
for potential key policy implications. Indeed, smoothing 
the availability of finances to renewable energy firms 
should be a key priority for governments to allow those 
firms to be able to increase cleaner energy production 
and address the threat of the increasing greenhouse 
gases and the achievement of intergenerational energy 
security. Another potential key policy appointed by the 
authors is the provision of tax credits to investors in 
stocks of cleaner energy firms, encouraging the socially 
faithful investors and others to invest more funds in the 
stocks of companies that produce cleaner energy. They 
also claim the development of Government policies to 
scale back the economic incentives to use, produce and 
invest in fossil fuels, through measures like the increased 
carbon tax, stringent usage guidelines for producing and 
using fossil fuels, while providing increased govern-
mental support for cleaner energy initiatives.
Horbach et al. [7] compare France to Germany. In 
their study, it is possible to ascertain the relevance of the 
regulatory push-pull effect for EIs documented by the 
significance of the respective variables, which confirms 
the importance of regulatory instruments in stimulating 
EIs by industrial firms. Furthermore, the results show 
that eco-innovative firms tend to patent significantly 
more than other innovators and that EU-wide centralized 
policies, like the EU-ETS, seem to be capable to pro-
mote Eco-Innovation. Moreover, it is possible to observe 
that in Germany the cost savings, especially the material 
and energy savings, play an important role in triggering 
EIs, as well.
According to Porter and Van Der Linde [9] (p. 98), 
“competitive advantage rests not on static efficiency nor 
on optimizing within fixed constraints, but on the capac-
ity for innovation and improvement that shift the con-
straints”. Taking this thought into account, Porter and 
Van Der Linde [9] (p.116) claimed that “the focus 
should be on relaxing the environment-competitiveness 
trade-off and the orientation should shift from pollution 
control to resource productivity”. Furthermore, it is 
asserted that success can not come from policies that 
proclaim that environment will triumph over the indus-
try, nor from policies that promise that industry will 
conquer the environment. As an alternative, the success 
must involve innovation-based solutions to promote 
environment and industrial competitiveness.
2.2. EU-ETS 
The world’s largest carbon pricing regime is the EU-ETS, 
a cap-and-trade system of CO2 allowances – constrains 
the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating 
a limited number of tradable emission allowances, 
requiring those sources to surrender allowances accord-
ing to their emissions. It was adopted in 2003, with a 
pilot phase from 2005 to 2007, a Kyoto phase from 2008 
to 2012, and the third phase from 2013 to 2020 [23]. A 
new phase (Phase IV) has recently started in 2021 and 
will be extended until 2030 to fulfill the emission reduc-
tion targets as a part of the EU´s contribution to the Paris 
Agreement [2].
In the study of Borghesi et al. [24] for Italy, most 
respondents across different sectors agreed that energy 
costs’ factors tend to dominate specific CO2-targeted 
policies in terms of EI-related impacts. Within the same 
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study, it is stated that policy certainty and financial sup-
port are two pre-conditions to sustain initial innovation 
adoption. In this particular case of Italy, Borghesi et al. 
[15] assert that, in the first phase of the EU-ETS, the 
majority of the firms adopted a “wait and see” policy, 
using the allowances at their disposal instead of invest-
ing in new technologies to benefit from the opportunity 
to sell the permits.
The over-allocation (in Phase I) and therefore the 
economic recession (in Phase II) have reduced the direct 
impact of the EU-ETS on emissions, however, the com-
bination of rigorous monitoring and awareness, as well 
as a positive carbon price, has driven some abatement on 
emissions [25]. Interviews from this study suggest that 
the EU-ETS has affected investment decisions in limited 
ways (e.g. mainly small-scale efficiency-related invest-
ments instead of being sufficiently clear to drive large, 
long-term investment decisions). Furthermore, pieces of 
evidence from Phase I and Phase II claim that significant 
windfall profits only endure for a limited time, as a 
policy can and will respond once the evidence is obvi-
ous. Thus, the EU-ETS system has been ready to deter 
major carbon-intensive investments and consequently to 
release capital that could be turned to low carbon invest-
ment, which reinforces the importance of EU-ETS in 
business decision-making.
In an Italian-based study of Pontoglio [26], it is pos-
sible to observe that the EU-ETS scheme is not able to 
award and stimulate investments, having been scarcely 
favorable to innovations. This study refers to the invest-
ment and the limited span of the allocation periods as a 
long-term problem since they resulted not be sufficient 
to provide a predictable long-term signal for invest-
ments. The author states that carbon dioxide emitted by 
energy-intensive industries can not be reduced using 
low-cost end-of-pipe abatement solutions. In contrast, it 
requires improvements in energy efficiency and invest-
ments in renewable resources, whose adoption is influ-
enced both by energy and carbon prices. Furthermore, 
the actors involved in their development and diffusion 
are machinery suppliers who are fundamental actors in 
the innovation system.
Nevertheless, theoretically, it is expected that envi-
ronmental policies can stimulate the adoption and dif-
fusion of carbon-friendlier technological solutions. In 
this study, it is shown that its potential in the EU-ETS 
Phase I was sharply weakened due to some flaws in its 
design, more precisely in the allocation principles, new 
entrants and closures rules, and issues related to its 
time profile, which depart the Phase I of EU-ETS from 
an ideal trading mechanism. In fact, in the first two 
phases of the EU-ETS allowance prices were volatile 
and sometimes very low, therefore resulting in a weak 
incentive to implement energy efficiency and innova-
tion [27]. But, despite an imperfect design, it has man-
aged to incite an increase in the adoption of emitting 
technologies [28]. Even in the third EU-ETS phase, 
which was more stringent, it only had limited effects on 
the rate and direction of corporate research, develop-
ment, and demonstration (RD&D) and its adoption 
[28]. In this study, the authors state long-term emission 
reduction targets as an important trigger of RD&D. 
Furthermore, it was found that technology policies, in 
the form of demand-pull and technology-push instru-
ments, have significant effects on low carbon techno-
logical change, and are therefore an important factor 
compensating for the insufficient effect of emissions 
trading. The Porter Hypothesis states that a policy like 
the EU-ETS can incite EI and improve the financial 
performance of regulated firms. However, according to 
Osses [29], the policy did not enhance the financial 
performance of regulated companies, which can be 
further expounded by the time lag associated with the 
profitability of EIs. In this study, it is shown, by a com-
parison among the eco-patent output, that EU-ETS 
only induced innovation in its second implementation 
phase, which can be a result of a higher degree of reg-
ulatory stringency and an increased level of certainty 
compared to phase one. Thereby, policymakers should 
enact EU-ETS reforms focused on decreasing the emis-
sion cap, introducing means to stabilize the allowance 
price, carefully assessing if the scheme can be extended 
to other sectors, and launching other EI enhancing 
instruments.
Innovation risks and the related high initial invest-
ment costs of technological boundaries limit invest-
ments in technological innovation to reduce carbon 
emissions, and thus investments tend to focus mainly on 
market-available technologies for core processes [27]. 
The study of Gasbarro et al. [27] for the Italian pulp and 
paper industry concludes that, since financial uncertain-
ties usually deter both technical and organizational inno-
vation, it is necessary to highlight and maintain the 
commitment to improving environmental performances. 
As a consequence, it is strictly crucial to stimulate the 
investment in innovation through regulation enforce-
ments, which will potentially affect the international 
competitiveness of pulp and paper companies.
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In the Rogge and Hoffmann [30] study, for the sec-
toral innovation system of power generation technolo-
gies, it is possible to see that the EU-ETS has impacted 
at four levels: (i) knowledge and technologies; (ii) actors 
and networks; (iii) institutions; and (iv) on-demand. 
Regarding the first impact, EU-ETS accelerates the 
innovation process, being an additional driver for RD&D 
on higher efficiency levels (materials, components) and 
indirectly benefiting RD&D on renewables. Actors and 
networks include the regulatory pull from power gener-
ators to technology providers, the increased corporate 
RD&D spending, especially of larger players, and the 
heterogeneity of actors. On institutions, EU-ETS fosters 
changes in thinking, including in top management, and 
promotes the distribution of CO2 policies across the 
organization through its integration in procedures, struc-
tures, and corporate innovation routines. Finally, on-de-
mand was impacted especially because of new plants, 
with a temporary spike in pre2012 interest in invest-
ments, and due to the incentives provided for fuel 
switching and cogeneration, and the measures improv-
ing energy efficiency that raised plants’ profitability.
In the study of Rogge and Hoffmann [30], it can also 
be found that the EU-ETS scheme mainly affects the rate 
and direction of technological change of power genera-
tion technologies within the large-scale, coal-based 
power generation technological regime, to which carbon 
capture technologies are added as a new technological 
trajectory. For the German pulp and paper industry, 
Rogge et al. [31] found that the EU-ETS and the interna-
tional climate policy had barely affected their innovation 
activities. Instead, RD&D decisions and companies’ 
adoption tend to keep them on established and primarily 
market-factor-driven technological business-as-usual 
trajectories. Low prices for CO2, a high share of free 
allocation, and regulatory uncertainty are some of the 
likely reasons for the low relevance of the EU-ETS. 
Therefore, increasing the stringency and predictability 
of the current policy mix would be expected to contrib-
ute towards a decarbonization path [28, 31].
3. Methods
The data collection matched the same period and sectors 
of both the CIS database and the EU-ETS database. The 
sample is composed of 11524 firms answering the CIS 
(sectors C, H, and D, see Table 2), from 13 European 
countries (BG-Bulgaria; CY-Cyprus; CZ-Czech 
Republic; DE-Germany; EE-Estonia; EL-Greece; 
HR-Croatia; HU-Hungary; LT-Lithuania; LV-Latvia; 
PT-Portugal; RO-Romania; SK-Slovakia), belonging to 
the sectors that participate in the EU-ETS and that are 
also included in CIS. These include the Thermoelectric 
Plants, Ceramics, Cement and Lime, Cogeneration, 
Combustion Plants, Iron Metals, Pulp and Paper, 
Refineries, Glass and Aviation.
The CIS survey is a three years survey, where only 
2008 (2006-2008) and 2014 surveys (2012-2014) 
directly asked firms if they had adopted any eco-innova-
tion strategy and if these were related to the product, 
process, marketing, or organizational innovations. To 
have a common period of analysis among both datasets, 
we have collected data from the period 2012-2014.
For the EU-ETS the total number of available firms 
reporting allowances allocation and total emissions 
during the 2012-2014 period was 2727 (see Table 1). 
Both datasets were joined by computing averages, con-
sidering the values reported by each firm in each eco-
nomic activity sector.
In the analyzed countries, it was considered the indi-
vidual data of all companies participating in the EU-ETS, 
regarding their level of emissions and the number of 
licenses allocated, available on the European 
Commission’s website (https://ec.europa.eu/clima/ets/), 
in millions of tonnes. The observed emissions and 
received allowances per company were aggregated by 
sector, and following [15] we constructed an EU-ETS 
policy indicator to capture policy stringency that will be 
used as an explanatory variable in the econometric anal-
ysis to be performed in the following section.
The indicator s is a ratio between the emissions (e) of 
sector i and the EU-ETS allowances allocated to that 







=   (1)
The more emissions the sector i produces and the lower the 
level of its allowances, the more stringent is the ETS 
policy. If si > 1, it means the number of allowances at dis-
posal to sector i is lower than its emissions level, therefore 
the ETS policy is stringent for that sector. If, in contrast, si 
≤ 1 then the permits allocated to sector i are equal or lower 
to its emissions, so the ETS policy is not stringent.
Table 2 presents the available CIS data in the period 
2012-2014, especially considering the EI strategies 
implemented.
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Table 1. Number of available firms on CIS 2014 and EU-ETS by country and sector
CIS
Countries





17 155 34 106 83 109 115 135 90 129 98 80 102 28 1264
19 179 28 124 182 29 135 54 100 60 47 140 151 30 1259
23 336 75 153 132 106 168 147 134 141 52 299 181 56 1980
24 92 55 106 119 85 149 271 79 117 56 64 119 26 1338
25 779 55 250 353 85 149 271 634 117 56 583 339 205 3876
35 123 1 116 150 54 27 32 116 49 36 41 149 60 954
51 20 67 8 7 96 200 158 9 146 95 27 16 4 853
Total 1684 315 863 1026 564 943 1068 1162 759 440 1234 1057 409 11524
EU-ETS
Countries





7 5 0 6 127 2 12 0 4 0 2 22 6 6 192
2+3 64 3 230 874 35 20 20 124 52 72 48 115 76 1733
6+7+8 30 9 61 233 3 39 15 33 6 9 40 29 19 526
5 9 0 7 66 1 19 5 4 0 1 1 21 10 144
4 3 0 7 34 0 5 4 3 1 0 2 12 1 72
1 1 0 1 8 1 0 1 3 0 1 0 5 2 23
Aviation 4 1 4  2 7 1 3 2 1 9 2 1 37
Total 116 13 316 1342 44 102 46 174 61 86 122 190 115 2727
Notes: 17 (7 on EU-ETS) Manufacture of paper and paper products; 19 (2+3 in EU-ETS) Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products; 23 (6+7+8 in 
EU-ETS) Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (cement, ceramics, and glass); 24 (5 in EU-ETS) Manufacture of basic metals; 25 (4 in 
EU-ETS) Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment; 35 (1 in EU-ETS) Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; 
51 (Aviation in EU-ETS) Air transport.
Table 2. Variables description
Environmental benefits obtained within the enterprise
Ecoeno Reduced energy use or CO2 footprint (reduced total CO2 production) 1 = yes; 0 = no
Environmental benefits obtained during the consumption or use of a good or service by the end-user
Ecoenu Reduced energy use or CO2 footprint 1 = yes; 0 = no
Factors driving the enterprise’s decisions to introduce innovations with environmental benefits
Enereg Existing environmental regulations High = 3; Medium = 2; Low = 1; Not relevant=0
Enetx Existing environmental taxes, charges, or fees High = 3; Medium = 2; Low = 1; Not relevant = 0
Enregf Environmental regulations or taxes expected in the future* High = 3; Medium = 2; Low = 1; Not relevant = 0
Engra Government grants, subsidies, or other financial incentives for environmental innovations
High = 3; Medium = 2; Low = 
1; Not relevant = 0
Other variables
SIZE1 If the number of employees under 50 1; 0 otherwise
TG Turnover growth between 2012 and 2014   (%)
Notes: *For example preparing environmental audits, setting environmental performance goals, ISO 14001 certification, ISO 50001 certification, etc.
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Although CIS is referred to the entire period 2012-
2014, the period of analysis was reduced to just one 
average year to avoid reducing the number of observa-
tions further. The EU-ETS data was reduced to the 
period average, as well. Provided both dependent and 
independent variables are in average terms for one year 
only, we used cross-section regression analysis. All esti-
mations have been performed using the Stata software.
Equations (2) and (3) were estimated to understand 
how the chosen factors drive the company’s decisions to 
introduce Eco-innovations according to the variables in 
Table 2. The two dependent variables are the environ-
mental benefits obtained within the enterprise, ecoeno, 
meaning reduced energy use or CO2 footprint (reduced 
total CO2 emissions), and the environmental benefits 
obtained during the consumption or use of a good or 
service by the end-user, ecoenu, meaning reduced 
energy use or CO2 footprint.
 ecoeno X W si i j i j j i j i i        , , 7   (2)
 ecoenu X W si i j i j j i j i i        , , 7  (3)
Where i refers to the economic activity sector, α is the 
regression constant, β the coefficients associated with 
each independent variable, X the vector of factors driv-
ing the enterprise’s decisions to introduce innovations 
with environmental benefits, namely, enereg (existing 
environmental regulations), enetx (existing environmen-
tal taxes, charges or fees), enregf (environmental regula-
tions or taxes expected in the future), engra (government 
grants, subsidies or other financial incentives for envi-
ronmental innovations), and W the vector of control 
variables composed by SIZE1 (if the number of employ-
ees in the firm is under 50) and TG (turnover growth 
between 2012 and 2014). The variable si is the average 
EU-ETS stringency policy indicator of firms that traded 
in this market during the 2012-2014 period and ε is the 
random component of the linear relationship between X 
and ecoenoi/ecoenui.
4. Results
The number of available firms on CIS has been associ-
ated with the companies in the EU-ETS and the results 
are discussed based on the interaction between the two 
groups. In this section, we will present the empirical 
results and discuss some policy implications derived 
from them.
4.1. Empirical Findings
As can be observed in Table 3 all variables have the 
same observation number (91, which corresponds to 7 
sectors in 13 countries), except the ETS stringency 
policy indicator, which has a lower sample, presenting 
78 cases, for the same countries and sectors. Nevertheless, 
there were countries with missing data for some sectors, 
meaning, there are sectors with available data in CIS that 
were not present in EU-ETS and vice versa, which made 
us match both sets of information, not being able to 
work with complete data for all sectors in all countries. 
In the descriptive statistics table, Table 3, we can also 
observe that the mean values are all positive, with si 
representing the highest value in contrast to the ecoeno 
and ecoenu that present the lowest ones, while the others 
have similar values between the ecoenu and si. Regarding 
the deviation, we can observe that the values are quite 
close and similar, except for ecoeno and ecoenu that are 
lower. It is also important to refer that the values are 
within the expected range, with all of them presenting 
null or positive values, except for TG suggesting the 
possibility of negative values for turnover growth, 
between 2012 and 2014.
Provided that on average si ≤ 1, more specifically, si = 
0.709, then the permits allocated to sector i on average 
are higher to its emissions, meaning that jointly for all 
sectors considered, the EU-ETS policy is not stringent. 
Moreover, the two dependent variables (environmental 
benefits obtained within the enterprise, and the environ-
mental benefits obtained during the consumption or use 
of a good or service by the end-user), present very low 
average values, being those with the lowest standard 
deviation as well. Thus, on average the firms answering 
the CIS survey during 2002-2004 have stated to  introduce 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
ecoeno 91 0.180 0.149 0.000 1.000
ecoenu 91 0.115 0.094 0.000 0.469
enereg 91 0.524 0.444 0.000 3.000
enetx 91 0.424 0.399 0.000 3.000
enregf 91 0.430 0.409 0.000 3.000
engra 91 0.260 0.216 0.000 1.122
SIZE1 91 0.553 0.232 0.000 1.000
TG 91 0.307 0.449 –0.333 2.750
si 78 0.709 0.338 0.268 2.419
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very few environmental benefits, which may be explained 
by the low incentives they had to perform eco-innova-
tions, representing higher imposed costs. However, this 
would as well imply that higher amounts of licenses need 
to be bought or lower emissions need to be released by 
these same firms. With a weak stringent EU-ETS policy 
(on average) and low stated EI measures, it is reasonable 
to state that the EU-ETS policy implications are not pro-
ducing the desired effects within these sectors, and they 
need to be reformulated to be more stringent and produce 
the environmental desired effects effectively.
The Pearson correlation analysis (Table 4) provides 
clear evidence, for a significance level of 1%, that there 
is a very large and positive relationship between enetx 
and enereg (0.977), enregf and enereg (0.986), and 
enregf and enetx (0.985), which reflects a very regulated 
market, potentially damaging corporations that do not 
have a strong financial background, especially if the 
stringency ratio is higher than 1 (Table 3). This means 
that the corporations emit more than the allowances 
allocated, and therefore there is a more stringent policy, 
and the innovation in this particular field is lower. These 
high values of correlation among explanatory variables 
might also conduct to multicollinearity issues, demand-
ing that these should be inserted individually in the 
regression performed to avoid spurious regressions. This 
might be because we have a small number of observa-
tions within the sample. Even so, the VIF values com-
puted do not reveal multicollinearity issues.
It is also important to note that for a significance level 
of 1%, the correlation between the indicators ecoeno, 
ecoenu, enereg, enetx, enregf and engra is positive and 
has a moderately weak relationship (namely, between 
enetx and ecoenu, 0.404). On the other hand, for all the 
remaining indicators with a statistically significant cor-
relation, some with a level of 5% (for example, between 
TG and ecoene) and others with a level of 10% (such as 
SIZE1 and ecoenu), there is a negative and considerably 
weak relationship. It should also be noted that the indi-
cator si does not present any significant correlation with 
the other variables, for the tested significance levels, 
namely at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance.
Table 5 presents the cross-section regression results 
where both Enetx (existing environmental taxes, charges, 
or fees) and Enregf (environmental regulations or taxes 
expected in the future) reveal to have a negative impact 
over ecoeno, the latter in a nonsignificant way, thus turn-
ing harder to reduce energy usage or CO2 footprint.
Moreover, Enereg (existing environmental regula-
tions) and Enegra (government grants and subsidies) 
have a significant and positive impact on energy and 
CO2-related EI, which can evidence the effectiveness of 
this kind of policy. Size has a significant and negative 
impact on the dependent variable, which means that 
small enterprises (in particular, with a number of 
employees under 50) have more difficulties on eco-inno-
vating in energy and emissions fields. Nevertheless, 
concerning turnover growth, evidence shows that com-
panies with a higher TG, eco-innovate less. The strin-
gency indicator (s) revealed only to be significant in 
explaining Ecoenu, with a negative coefficient sign, 
which means that the more stringent the EU-ETS policy 
is, the fewer EIs activities are pursued.
Results point for some interesting policy directions to 
be pursued as will be discussed in the next subsection. 
Similar to the results presented by Madaleno et al. [32], 
Table 4. Pearson correlation analysis
 ecoeno ecoenu Enereg enetx enregf engra SIZE1 TG si
ecoeno 1         
ecoenu 0.652*** 1        
enereg 0.791*** 0.481*** 1       
enetx 0.782*** 0.404*** 0.977*** 1      
enregf 0.791*** 0.428*** 0.986*** 0.985*** 1     
engra 0.449*** 0.727*** 0.650*** 0.591*** 0.602*** 1    
SIZE1 –0.074 –0.205* 0.068 0.076 0.092 –0.119 1   
TG –0.253** –0.184* –0.188* –0.174* –0.198* –0.109 –0.151 1  
si –0.132 –0.159 –0.064 –0.057 –0.082 –0.059 0.039 –0.135 1
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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size exerts a particular influence over the adoption of EI 
strategies. Indeed, smaller companies support higher costs 
and have lower access to government grants and subsidies 
preventing them from having higher investment levels, as 
well as preventing them from the desirable future sustain-
ability that should be achieved. Therefore, policymakers 
should provide more incentives, lower taxes, and ensure 
that smaller firms’ participation in the EU-ETS market 
will be fair and properly weighted (prioritizing these is 
important for the future sustainability of the EU market).
To perform a robustness check, estimation results have 
been repeated to decrease the possible effects of het-
eroskedasticity that may be presented by the data. 
Regarding Table 6, where robust standard errors are used 
in the estimation, the differences that distinguish it from 
Table 5, for example, a change in the standard error values 
and a non-significant change in some of the values of p > 
t, do not change the overall interpretation of the study. The 
exception is the effect of environmental regulations 
(enereg) whose impact is no longer  significant (up to a 
10% level) in reducing energy use or CO2 footprint during 
consumption or use of a good or service by the end-user.
Table 5. Cross-section regression results
Dependent: ecoeno
 Coef. Std. Err. T P > t F(7, 70) =
Enereg 0.499 0.181 2.75 0.008 12.3
Enetx –0.343 0.183 –1.88 0.064 Prob > F =
Enregf –0.177 0.215 –0.83 0.411 0.000
Engra 0.240 0.142 1.69 0.095 R-squared
SIZE1 –0.099 0.044 –2.24 0.028 0.5515
TG –0.050 0.024 –2.12 0.038 Adj R-squared
si –0.041 0.030 –1.36 0.178 0.5067
_cons 0.165 0.038 4.33 0.000  
Dependent: ecoenu
 Coef. Std. 
Err.
t P > t F(7, 70) =
enereg 0.218 0.122 1.78 0.079 15.44
enetx –0.192 0.123 –1.56 0.124 Prob > F =
enregf –0.063 0.145 –0.44 0.665 0
engra 0.272 0.096 2.84 0.006 R-squared
SIZE1 –0.041 0.030 –1.38 0.173 0.6069
TG –0.034 0.016 –2.1 0.039 Adj R-squared
si –0.035 0.020 –1.74 0.087 0.5676
_cons 0.094 0.026 3.64 0.001  
Looking at both Tables 5 and 6, we also confirm the 
overall significance of the results achieved provided the 
F-stat results and considering the adjusted R squared 
obtained from estimations. From the results, it may be as 
well inferred that existing environmental regulations are 
important to justify a firm’s implementation of EI strate-
gies. However, existing environmental taxes, charges, or 
fees seems not to be significant to force companies to 
pursue these strategies (depending on the EI strategy). 
The same happens when we consider the impact of envi-
ronmental regulations or taxes expected in the future, 
which could lead policymakers to increase taxes in the 
future, as for now, they do not represent a concern. Since 
in this phase 4 (2021-2030), and based on the current 
legislation, scope changes have not been agreed, but yet 
considered as part of the review of the ETS foreseen 
(under the 2030 Climate Target Plan), it leaves room for 
stricter policies and perhaps the inclusion of more 
 economic activity sectors in the EU-ETS scheme. 
Table 6. Cross-section regression results with robust standard errors
Dependent: ecoeno
 Coef. Robust 
Std. 
Err.
T P > t F(7, 70) 
=
enereg 0.499 0.196 2.55 0.013 14.59
enetx –0.343 0.193 –1.78 0.079 Prob > F =
enregf –0.177 0.175 –1.01 0.316 0.000
engra 0.240 0.123 1.95 0.056 R-squared
SIZE1 –0.099 0.043 –2.30 0.024 0.5515
TG –0.050 0.016 –3.06 0.003 Root MSE =
si –0.041 0.028 –1.45 0.150 0.087
_cons 0.165 0.050 3.28 0.002  
Dependent: ecoenu
ecoenu Coef. Robust 
Std. 
Err.
T P > t F(7, 70) 
=
enereg 0.218 0.145 1.50 0.138 14.81
enetx –0.192 0.120 –1.60 0.115 Prob > F =
enregf –0.063 0.158 –0.40 0.691 0.000
engra 0.272 0.096 2.83 0.006 R-squared
SIZE1 –0.041 0.030 –1.35 0.182 0.6069
TG –0.034 0.012 –2.80 0.007 Root MSE =
si –0.035 0.018 –2.00 0.050 0.059
_cons 0.094 0.032 2.89 0.005
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In  contrast, government grants, subsidies, or other finan-
cial incentives for environmental innovations justify 
increased measures of EI within the firms considered in 
the sample, leaving them highly dependent on the gov-
ernment, which opens room for the discussion of the 
effectiveness of these supports. Further, it may impact 
future competitiveness in the market, imposing addi-
tional costs to the desired sustainability goals [17-19; 
28-30].
4.2. Results Discussion
In this subsection, we raise some discussion about the 
empirical findings obtained in the previous subsection.
Industrial competitiveness has an important role in 
consumer effectiveness, especially in achieving sustaina-
bility targets [33]. In the literature, it is pointed that the 
industry’s environmental reputation is related to the 
adopted sustainability strategies [33-34]. Consumers are 
becoming more aware of the need to save the planet and 
to adopt sustainable practices, starting with household 
responsible consumption patterns adoption. Industries 
should then take the needed steps in adopting these 
behaviors keeping themselves competitive in a globalized 
market while keeping answering the consumers’ demand 
[33]. This can only be done with improved technologies 
[34], changes in energy demand, and increased consump-
tion [20]. The literature also highlights that industries’ 
environmental reputation increases sustainability strate-
gies while considering customers’ environmental con-
cerns and keeping financial and market performance [33].
Individuals will continue consuming and population 
consumption needs will continue to rise. Industries will 
have to follow the growing pattern and provide goods at 
an accelerated rate. This will certainly increase the envi-
ronmental impact and imply sustainability goals patterns 
to be rethought and reformulated. The best solution, 
from our viewpoint, will be to favor the necessary con-
ditions for industries to be able to answer the growing 
needs patterns while attending simultaneously to sus-
tainability goals, which can only be achieved at the 
expense of renewable energy technologies [35], thus 
favoring the adoption of EI strategies in firms. 
Additionally, we should be aware of the possible cost 
pass-through identified in the literature [36] from firms 
in the EU-ETS to consumers in some sectors.
The EI strategies explored in this article are actions 
based purely on returns over investments realized by the 
firms considered in the sample (or stated, since the data 
has strived from the CIS survey). Even with low govern-
mental support, which turns the new desired green world 
unrealistic thus far, both businesses, consumers, and the 
environment can win by working jointly. This can only 
be ensured if being green is no longer a cost of doing 
business, but a result of innovation, new market oppor-
tunities, advanced technologies, and wealth creation 
[37,38]. Policymakers are required to devise mecha-
nisms and offer incentives as to the adoption of EI strat-
egies within firms, or even government intervention to 
support the EU-ETS scheme to lower the cost burden 
supported either by firms and consumers [36,38]. These 
pursued strategies have to be done especially in those 
industries where there is evidence that paying to be 
green is ambiguous, or where environmental manage-
ment practices investments in EI are not evident. Thus, 
incentives to encourage the enhancement and adoption 
of environmental initiatives in economic activity sectors 
should be offered, as proved in our results and as high-
lighted by Postula and Raczkowski (2020) [39].
For these policies to be pursued there should be a clear 
distinction among firm dimensions [32] and risk expo-
sure [21]. In Madaleno et al. [32] there is clear evidence 
that additional costs are imposed by the final consumer. 
Smaller firms should thus benefit from higher govern-
ment support since image issues are harder to maintain, 
adopt and adapt, provided turnover growth is reduced in 
these firms if greater EI strategies are to be followed 
[32]. Therefore, and considering that most firms in the 
European markets are SMEs (small and medium enter-
prises) [40], investors and subventions should be priori-
tized for smaller firms, even if the largest firms are more 
capable of minimizing the risk perception [34- 32].
Concerning EU ETS phases, and the replicability of 
our results, some considerations can also be made. As 
mentioned before, this study focuses on the period 2012-
2014, including the last year of the second EU ETS trad-
ing period (2008-2012) and two years of the third trading 
period (2013-2020). The results presented for this period 
can be easily extended for the complete third period, as 
the main distinctive feature of phase 1 and phase 2 is the 
number of allowances to be allocated for free to the 
industry. Nevertheless, for the following phases, our 
results should be rather conservative. For instance, for the 
third period, as the main difference between the first two 
phases and phase 3 is that no free allocation for electricity 
production exists and the free allocation to the industry is 
based on EU harmonized rules, we believe that conclu-
sions could be different and thus EU-ETS could reveal to 
be a strong incentive to EIs and to affect the financial 
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performance of regulated companies. Moreover, as the 
main aim of the fourth period (2021-2030) is to increase 
even more the pace of emissions cuts, to establish a bet-
ter-targeted carbon leakage framework, and to provide 
funds for low-carbon innovation and energy sector mod-
ernization, we believe these impacts (on innovations, 
emissions, and finance) could even be more empathize.
Most of the well-succeeded industries, like the petro-
leum companies, have shown to fail to be fully commit-
ted to climate change mitigation, only willing to pay off 
their emissions. Therefore, only with the promotion of 
the investment in breakthrough technologies, such as 
carbon capture, will be possible to meet the Paris 
Agreement goals. The literature provides several policy 
suggestions to help to promote the investment in these 
technologies. A primary requirement provided by Bataille 
et al. [41] is to make the decarbonization of energy-inten-
sive industries a priority at all levels, i.e. from the inter-
national to the sectoral level, incorporating it in each 
country’s climate policy. Stakeholders are also important 
drivers to communicate, coordinate and legitimate transi-
tions. They can create a common vision among govern-
ment, industry, and society while defining long-term 
strategies for the whole innovation chain. Another crucial 
measure would be the elimination of subsidies for fossil 
fuel production and use, and the internalization of carbon 
content, through carbon pricing, at all stages of the mate-
rial’s life cycle, from production to end-use, with more 
stringent regulation. Research into supporting institutions 
and business models should also be prioritized. Other 
authors (e.g. Wesseling et al. [42]) claim that changes in 
user behavior, culture, and industry strategies help decar-
bonizing industries. This can be attained by a well-de-
signed consumer education program to help some already 
developed technologies to be introduced more rapidly 
into the market [43]. Moreover, the government should 
become less risk-averse in its support for investment in 
breakthrough technologies and both risks and costs 
should be shared between industry and governments [42]. 
Therefore, a globally coordinated policy approach would 
be crucial.
It is difficult for emerging technologies, like electric 
and fuel cell vehicles, to compete in a market with 
mature technologies, like internal combustion engines. 
Indeed, when some incumbents perceive climate-related 
concerns as a threat rather than an opportunity, they tend 
to lobby to avoid the threatening of their competitors 
[44]. These lobbying groups comprise industry associa-
tions that have political influence. The new technolo-
gies, in turn, are perceived as risky, costly, and unable to 
compete with the economies of scale of established 
technologies. To thrive in such an unjust scenario 
Bataille et al. (2018) [41] propose these firms engage in 
research collaborations and cooperations with other 
stakeholders to help developing economies of scale for 
green procurement. Furthermore, governments should 
stop giving in to pressure from lobbies by eliminating 
the subsidies for fossil fuel-related technologies and 
adopt more stringent carbon-related regulations.
5. Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on the role of the 
EU-ETS for innovation in energy efficiency and CO2 
abatement. Our estimates show that EIs are associated 
with various factors, both internal and external to the 
firm. External forces, as the existence of environmental 
regulations and financial incentives for environmental 
innovations (e.g. government grants and subsidies), 
have a positive impact on reducing energy use or CO2 
footprint within the enterprise and during the consump-
tion or use of a good or service by the end-user. In con-
trast, environmental taxes, charges or fees, and the 
stringency of the EU-ETS revealed not to be an incen-
tive for this kind of EIs. We find that future expected 
regulation is not significant for explaining EI. Different 
authors have studied the possibility to apply carbon tax-
ation or other market policies to share the emissions 
responsibilities between consumers and producers, but 
the conclusions are not consensual. For instance, Jakob 
et al (2021) [45] proposed an “Economic Benefit Shared 
Responsibility” scheme to account for carbon emissions 
associated with the production of traded goods and ser-
vices. The authors suggest the use of the economic ben-
efits producers and consumers derive from being able to 
generate emissions-free of charge, as a measure to share 
responsibility for trade-related emissions, through a 
carbon price. By contrast, other studies apply alternative 
approaches, based on the counterfactual perspective of 
the absence of trade, evaluating a country’s imports and 
exports either relative to the average global emission 
intensity for the respective goods and services [46], or 
from the perspective of how a country’s trade specializa-
tion contributes to meeting global consumption in a 
carbon-efficient way [47]. These last authors proposed a 
scheme for assigning credits and penalties. In this sense, 
reductions in global emissions resulting from cleaner 
exports can be accounted for. Combining such schemes 
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with accounting schemes for shared producer and con-
sumer responsibility in dashboards for “multiple carbon 
accounting” [48] could help to create a broad depiction 
of the responsibility for trade-related emissions. Several 
authors view the fulfillment and reinforcement of the 
Paris Agreement as the next steps in the global response 
to climate change [49]. Any international negotiation 
about assigning burdens (or distributing efforts, or shar-
ing responsibilities) should be subject to basic consider-
ations, as criteria for equity and fairness, historical 
responsibilities, and the countries’ capacity to pay [47].
Internal factors, as the size, have a significant and neg-
ative impact on the dependent variable, which means that 
small enterprises have more difficulties in eco-innovat-
ing. Nevertheless, the turnover growth coefficient evi-
dence that companies with a higher TG eco-innovate less.
Our results are aligned with the literature, once EU-ETS 
has barely affected companies innovation activities and 
did not enhance the financial performance of regulated 
companies [28, 29, 31]. In this sense, policymakers 
should focus on decreasing the emission cap, introducing 
means to stabilize the allowance price, carefully assessing 
whether the scheme can be extended to other sectors. 
They should also launch other eco-innovation enhancing 
instruments, and increase the stringency and predictability 
of the current policy as part of a policy mix aiming to steer 
the rate and direction of technological change towards 
low carbon emissions, a non-linear process characterized 
by lock-ins [28, 29, 31]. As the regulatory conditions for 
the EU-ETS are determined up to the last phase, in the 
short to medium term, policy-makers should rely on com-
plementary policies like innovation, and thus on technol-
ogy-push policies to guide RD&D activities towards low 
carbon production technologies at competitive costs. 
Besides, a good complementary step would be the 
achievement of a globally binding climate deal that would 
set long-term reduction targets. Utopically, such a treaty 
would lead to a global carbon price and hence at the same 
time address producers’ concerns about competitiveness, 
leading to a larger international demand for low-carbon 
technologies by technology providers [31].
This study has, however, some limitations. The period 
of our selected data was short due to the small CIS survey 
period, which has prevented us from performing a more 
complex estimation. Moreover, a wider range of countries 
should have been considered to minimize the error of this 
European study that has encompassed 13 countries only, 
and we should have used more recent data, which was not 
possible due to the lack of recently available data. 
Furthermore, we needed to use average values by eco-
nomic activity sector, since there is no possibility to 
cross-check data for each company between CIS and the 
EU-ETS, due to confidentiality issues. Thus, in future 
studies it would be interesting to study the impact of these 
measures on individual companies’ financial perfor-
mance, using more recent data, expanding the countries’ 
range and variables, and exploring different regression 
models.
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